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Abstract
While multiple-country repeated cross-sectional datasets are increasingly available, few 
cross-national studies fully exploit the richness of such data. This paper contributes to the 
practical knowledge on statistical analysis of cross-national time series data. For that pur-
pose, we present a novel application of a societal growth curve model (Fairbrother, 2014) 
analyzing the pressing question whether the economic crisis of the past years has stirred up 
immigration-related threat perceptions among European citizens. Concretely, we analyze 
six rounds of European Social Survey data (2002-2012) to investigate whether indicators of 
economic downturn are systematically related to increased levels of economic and cultural 
threat. The societal growth curve modeling approach makes it possible to set longitudinal 
effects apart from cross-sectional differences and thus overcomes the weaknesses of analy-
ses relying on single-shot cross-sectional data. Our results provide evidence that grow-
ing unemployment as well as decreasing rates of economic growth instigate feelings of 
economic threat. Rather than affecting citizens’ opinion uniformly, the economic crisis is 
found to have the strongest impact on economic threat among low educated people. While 
this study provides evidence that economic shocks affect concerns that immigration is bad 
for the economy, feelings of cultural threat are not affected by economic crises.
Keywords: group conflict theory, economic vs. cultural threat, societal growth curves, 
European Social Survey
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Over the course of the last decades, cross-national data collections – such as the 
European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS), or the Interna-
tional Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – have accumulated trend data rendering 
it possible to monitor change in citizens’ values, attitudes and behavior. These data 
can be characterized as cross-national repeated cross-sections: Multiple countries 
are observed across a time range, but at each point of observation a different cross-
section of the national population is surveyed. The potential contribution of this 
design to social scientific insights is very large. The longitudinal aspect can help to 
partially overcome the well-known but crucial causality problem that single-shot 
cross-national studies suffer from. Cross-sectional studies can demonstrate that dif-
ferences in a context variable tend to coincide with particular patterns in public 
opinion at a given time point. Such correlational patterns only provide a very shaky 
empirical foundation to make claims about causality. Cross-national trend data can 
provide additional insights in the temporal order of the relationship, which is a nec-
essary (yet insufficient) condition for causality. However, according to the seminal 
work of Campbell and Stanley (1966; see also Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2001), a 
multi-location time series design can provide interesting insights, especially when 
experimental manipulation is not feasible.
While multiple-country repeated cross-sections are increasingly available, 
knowledge on statistical tools to optimally analyze such data is limited. As a 
result, many current cross-national studies do not fully exploit the richness of the 
available data. This paper demonstrates the practical implementation of a statisti-
cal model to analyze multi-country repeated cross-sectional datasets. The second 
purpose of this paper is to utilize the model to analyze the effect of the economic 
crisis on threat due to immigration among Europeans. We do this by providing 
a novel application of the societal growth curve model introduced by Fairbrother 
(2014). This model uses multilevel techniques to estimate how a particular aggre-
gated individual characteristic – such as ethnic threat - develops over time on the 
country level, and to assess whether contextual variables can explain the observed 
over-time developments. We apply this model to test whether the 2008 economic 
crisis has affected perceptions of ethnic threat among European citizens. Numerous 
single-shot cross-national studies have presented empirical evidence that economic 
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conditions are related to prejudice, perceived threat, and anti-immigrant sentiments 
(for reviews, see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). 
Studying the development of exclusionary attitudes over time in multiple countries, 
however, provides a more stringent test of the causal impact of economic condi-
tions (for examples, see Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, Raijman 
& Gorodzeisky, 2006). The societal growth curve approach allows disentangling 
longitudinal and cross-sectional effects of economic context.
Concretely, we employ the societal growth curve model in the current study 
to address the following research questions: (1) In what way has the prevalence of 
perceived immigrant threat in European societies evolved in the period before and 
after the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008? (2) Are the observed develop-
ments in perceived threat driven by changes in economic conditions due to the 
crisis? (3) Does the crisis affect threat perceptions across the whole population, 
or are crisis effects instead contingent on social positions in the form of education 
level? To answer these questions, we analyze data from the European Social Sur-
vey (ESS) across the years 2002-2012, providing information about immigration-
related threat perceptions in 28 countries before, during, and after the outbreak of 
the economic crisis.
The paper starts by providing the theoretical background and formulating our 
research hypotheses. Second, we explain how societal growth curve models can be 
used to test our hypotheses using multiple-country repeated cross-sections. Sub-
sequently, we present the data and measures we use. The paper concludes with a 
discussion on the results of the analysis and the usefulness of the societal growth 
curve model.
Theoretical Background:  
A Dynamic Formulation of Group Conflict Theory
Group Conflict Theory (GCT) offers a framework to understand possible effects 
of the economic crisis on prejudice, threat perceptions and anti-immigration senti-
ments. The central proposition of GCT is that negative attitudes toward outgroups 
– such as immigrants and ethnic minorities – develop as a defensive reaction of 
the majority group to the perception that prerogatives of the own group are threat-
ened (Blumer, 1958; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2016; Olzak, 1992; Quillian, 1995). 
Not only economic goods (such as well-paid jobs, affordable housing, or the scarce 
resources of the welfare state), but also cultural goods (such as cultural traditions or 
society-specific norms and values) can become the subject of intergroup competi-
tion (Stephan et al., 1998). The distinction between the different sources of threat 
perceptions is of crucial importance, as economic and cultural threat perceptions 
can differ in their antecedents (such as social class basis) as well as in their conse-
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quences (e.g., prejudice or voting behavior) (Harell et al., 2012; Lucassen & Lub-
bers, 2012; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004).
According to GCT, majority-members’ threat perceptions are influenced by 
contextual factors, such as economic conditions or immigrant group size (Blalock, 
1967). In times of poor economic conditions, the material goods that are the object 
of intergroup competition become scarcer, thereby leading to an intensification of 
(mainly economic) threat perceptions. Furthermore, a more sizeable immigrant 
group implies that the native population is confronted with a larger number of com-
petitors, again causing intergroup competition to become stronger. Several empiri-
cal studies have confirmed that anti-immigration attitudes are more widespread 
in adverse economic contexts (Quillian, 1995; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov et al., 
2006) with high levels of ethnic diversity (Lahav, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Scheep-
ers, Gijsberts & Coenders, 2002; Schneider, 2008), although these effects could not 
always be replicated (Sides & Citrin, 2007). A serious limitation that can be often 
observed in this body of research is its reliance on cross-sectional data sources 
(Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). However, the finding that international differences 
in economic performance coincide with variations in public opinion at a given time 
point hardly proves that economic downturns may be a cause of threat perceptions. 
After all, numerous other variables – such as the immigration history of a country, 
the broader political climate, the media, or the implemented migration and integra-
tion policies – might intervene in the relationship between economy and public 
opinion (Schlueter, Meuleman & Davidov, 2013).
A dynamic reformulation of GCT (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman et 
al., 2009) instead proposes to study how attitude changes are driven by changes in 
the actual level of competition. The theoretical rationale for this focus on changes is 
that sudden shifts in economic prosperity or immigrant presence could have more 
substantial effects on public opinion than high but stable levels of actual competi-
tion (Hopkins, 2010). Sudden changes affect labor, housing, and other markets more 
strongly than slow-paced evolutions (Olzak, 1992) and usually receive wide media 
coverage (Schlueter & Davidov, 2013; McLaren, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 
2017). A crucial methodological advantage of focusing on longitudinal changes is 
that it offers a more stringent test of the causal relationships articulated in the GCT.
The – relatively few – empirical studies using a dynamic approach often 
support the propositions derived from GCT. Economic downturns were found to 
instigate threat perceptions and anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States (Quil-
lian, 1996), Canada (Wilkes & Corrigall-Brown, 2011; Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 
2008), Germany (Coenders & Scheepers, 2008), and the Netherlands (Coenders & 
Scheepers, 1998; Coenders et al., 2008). Also, studies combining a cross-national 
and longitudinal perspective confirm the role of economic conditions (Semyonov 
et al., 2006; Meuleman et al., 2009; Kuntz et al., 2017). Pichler (2010) furthermore 
demonstrates that economic conditions can also alter the mechanisms through 
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which threat perceptions are formed. During periods of unfavorable economic con-
ditions economic concerns come to the fore in the formation of threat perceptions, 
while cultural concerns are suppressed.
A limitation of existing studies is that they span periods with only relatively 
small economic fluctuations. Yet, the recent economic turmoil might be conceived 
as a new critical juncture that sets in motion different mechanisms, compared to 
those active during more modest economic fluctuations (Billiet, Meuleman & De 
Witte, 2014; Semyonov et al., 2006). Little is known about the impact of a serious 
economic crisis. This study therefore tests whether the economic downturn Europe 
has been experiencing in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has affected 
economic and cultural threat perceptions among majority-group citizens. Based on 
GCT, we expect that threat perceptions have increased in Europe since the begin-
ning of the crisis in 2008 (Hypothesis 1) and that changes in threat perceptions in 
European countries are related to country-level changes in economic conditions 
(Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, building on Pichler’s (2010) argument on the shifting 
foundations of threat perceptions, we expect that indicators of the economic con-
text will have a stronger impact on economic than on cultural threat perceptions 
(Hypothesis 3). Finally, the individual-level component of GCT suggests that the 
threat-inducing effect of the crisis might be stronger among individuals in social-
structurally vulnerable positions  in the form of low education levels, whereas there 
is no such effect among those who are highly educated (as a proxy for being well 
off). This would, in other words, imply that the effect of the crisis on threat percep-
tions interacts (negatively) with education (Hypothesis 4). 
Modeling Multiple-Country Repeated Cross-
sections: Societal Growth Curves
The aforementioned hypotheses can be tested by means of multiple-country 
repeated cross-sectional data, that is, data consisting of several countries that are 
observed at different time points, by surveying a large number of individuals. Such 
data contain a three-level hierarchical structure, with countries at the highest level, 
country-years at the middle level, and individuals at the lowest level. This nested 
structure can be taken into account by fitting a societal growth curve model (Fair-
brother, 2014) that estimates how an individual characteristic evolves over time 
within countries - see equation (1). 
0 1 1 0 0β β ν ν= + + + + +itj tj j tj j tj itjY Time Time u e   (1)
( )2 ~ 0,σitj ewithe N
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Yitj represents a measured characteristic (e.g. perceived threat) for an individual 
i, surveyed at time point t in country j. β0 is the grand intercept in this model, 
referring to the predicted level of Y at the beginning of the time series averaged 
across all countries. By including the variable ‘time’ as a fixed effect at the second 
level (country-years), the overall evolution of the dependent variable Y is modeled, 
which is an essential feature of the growth curve approach. In equation (1), the time 
effect is linear (with an effect parameter  β1), but the model can be extended in a straightforward way to include more complex functional forms of growth. Random 
effects for the intercept (ν0j) and the slope (ν1j) of the growth curve are included to 
accommodate the country specificity of threat developments over time, that is, how 
the growth curve in a specific country deviates from the average developmental 
pattern. The model also contains random components at the middle (uotj) and lowest 
(eitj) levels. uotj reflects how country-years deviate from the country-specific growth 
curve. eitj captures the individual-level residuals. This approach shows similarity to 
conventional multilevel growth curve models for panel data (e.g. Andreß, Golsch 
& Schmidt, 2013). The main difference is that the occurrence of repeated measure-
ments is not at the level of individuals, but rather at the level of the countries. As 
a consequence, the intercepts of the growth curve are situated at the level of the 
country-years (level 2), and the intercept variation is captured by its variance com-
ponent ν0j. The slope of the growth curve is estimated by the linear effect of the 
time variable, the slope variation is absorbed in its variance component ν1j. As such, 
the societal growth curve model is essentially a classical two-level growth curve 
model for countries, with an additional layer of individuals underneath.
One could add to this baseline model individual-level as well as contextual 
predictors. Of crucial importance is that the societal growth curve approach makes 
it possible to partition the impact of contextual variables into a cross-sectional 
and a longitudinal component. This decomposition takes place by simultaneously 
including a time-invariant (i.e., the average over the complete time series) and a 
time-varying component (the year-specific deviation of that average) of the contex-
tual variables into the models (Fairbrother, 2014; this decomposition is similar to 
disentangling between- and within-cluster covariate effects in clustered data – see 
Neuhaus & Kalbfleisch, 1998). 
Take a contextual variable Ztj that varies across countries as well as time 
points (e.g., the unemployment rate). Time-invariant component Z•j equals the 
value of this contextual variable for a particular country averaged over the whole 
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observed time series (e.g., the average unemployment rate of a specific country 
between 2001 and 2012). The parameter for this time-invariant component captures 
the cross-sectional relationship between context and threat levels, irrespective of 
changes over time. The time-varying component is calculated as the deviation of 
the observed value at a specific time point from the country average over the whole 
time series (Ztj - Z•j). The parameter for the time-varying component describes lon-
gitudinal relationships, that is, how variations in perceived threat over time within 
countries (from their longitudinal average) are associated with changes in a contex-
tual variable. Because Z•j and (Ztj - Z•j) are included simultaneously in the model, 
the parameter for the time-varying component reflects the pure longitudinal effect, 
controlling for its average over the whole time series. If there is a causal impact of 
a particular context variable, its longitudinal effect should be different from zero. 
Finally, cross-level interactions between the longitudinal variations of contex-
tual variables and individual characteristics can be included to investigate whether 
the growth curve components (intercept and slope) vary across different categories 
of individuals. 
Materials and Methods
Dataset: European Social Survey, 2002-2012
We analyze data from a time series of six rounds of the European Social Survey 
(ESS), spanning the period before and after the crisis (2002-2012). This multi-
location time-series design is one of the strongest alternatives when experimental 
manipulation is not feasible, under the condition that the event that should bring 
about change in the time series (the quasi treatment) is well specified a priori 
(which is the case here) (Campbell & Stanley, 1966: 38; see also Shadish, Cook 
& Campbell, 2001). The logic behind it is that it is unlikely that particular quasi-
experimental treatments are followed by an outcome change in multiple locations, 
if the effect is not causal. 
Since the focus is on change, we include only countries that participated in 
at least two ESS rounds. Our dataset comprises 28 countries with a total of 137 
country-year combinations. In all countries, strict probability samples of the resi-
dent population aged 15 years and older were drawn. Because we are interested in 
the attitude patterns among members of the majority population, respondents who 
were born outside the country, who have a foreign nationality, or who consider 
themselves as a member of an ethnic minority group are removed from the sample 
(see also Sarrasin, Green, Fasel & Davidov, 2015). The total sample size equals 
228,331 individuals (for sample sizes per country and year and country abbrevia-
tions, see Appendix 1).
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Measurements
Dependent variables – The ESS core module contains two items that were designed 
to measure economic and cultural threat perceptions.1 Respondents are invited to 
position themselves on an 11-point scale of which the endpoints refer to perceiving 
immigration as a disadvantage or as an advantage for the economy (‘Would you say 
it is generally bad or good for [country]’s economy that people come to live here 
from other countries?’) or the cultural life (‘Would you say that [country]’s cultural 
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other 
countries?’). The scales are reversed, so that 0 indicates low and 10 high threat. 
While these items have been used as indicators of a single concept of general group 
threat in previous research (Sides & Citrin, 2007), we analyze them separately to 
render the difference between economic and cultural sources of threat visible (for a 
similar approach, see Pichler, 2010).2 This approach is justified by the fact that both 
items contain – especially at the individual and country-year level – considerable 
unique information. The correlation between economic and cultural threat equals 
0.60 at the individual level, 0.71 at the country-year level, and 0.83 at the country 
level, implying that the two items share 36.0, 50.1, and 69.3 percent of their vari-
ance at these respective levels. These unique components allow sufficient room for 
differential effects of individual as well as contextual predictors (see below).
Contextual predictor variables – All contextual variables were retrieved 
from the Eurostat website (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat). The economic context is 
captured by means of the real GDP growth rate (Eurostat indicator nama_gdp_k) 
and the harmonized unemployment rate (Eurostat indicator une_rt_a). Changes 
in immigrant group size are measured by the inflow of foreign immigrants (Euro-
stat indicator migr_imm1ctz) per capita. We include the time-invariant as well as 
the time-varying components of these contextual variables. Concretely, we aver-
age contextual information over two years to indicate the time-varying component 
referring to a specific time point (e.g., the average unemployment rate of 2001 and 
2002 is taken to predict threat perceptions in the 2002 survey). This choice reflects 
1 The core module of the ESS contains a third item measuring immigration-related 
group threats (ESS item imwbcnt). Because the wording of this item is very general and 
does not refer to specific sources of threat, we do not include it in the analysis.
2 The use of single items instead of multi-item batteries makes it difficult to assess the 
reliability, validity, and cross-cultural comparability of the measurements. To get an in-
dication of the measurement quality, we performed multiple group confirmatory factor 
analysis (Davidov et al., 2014) on the three threat items included in the ESS across our 
137 country-year combinations. Partial measurement equivalence could be established 
for all countries but Ireland (the output can be obtained from the first author upon 
request). As a result, the data allow us to conduct meaningful comparisons across all 
countries and time points. To rule out that the outlier Ireland biases our conclusions, 
we re-estimated all our models excluding the Irish data as a robustness check, but the 
effects of the economic context remained unchanged.
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that the impact of economic contexts may be lagged. The time-invariant component 
is the average across the whole time series (2002-2012).
Individual-level predictor variables – In order to control for compositional 
differences – that is, the fact that European populations have a different composi-
tion in terms of several individual characteristics - we include a series of variables 
capturing social-structural positions and cultural dispositions that were shown to be 
relevant in previous research (e.g. Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Meuleman, Davi-
dov & Billiet 2009; Meuleman, Abts, Slootmaeckers, & Meeusen, 2018; Semyonov, 
Raijman & Gorodzeisky 2006). The social-structural variables are gender, age, 
number of years of education completed, degree of urbanization (from 1 = coun-
tryside to 5 = big city), employment status (distinguishing self-employed, higher 
service class, white collar, blue collar, unemployed, retired, in education, doing 
housework, disabled, and other) and subjective income. The latter variable is used 
as a proxy for the household income and is operationalized by the individual assess-
ment of whether one finds it difficult or comfortable to live on the present income 
(1 = very difficult; 2 = difficult; 3 = coping; 4 = living comfortably). Based on 
previous literature, we expect people in socially vulnerable positions, that is with 
lower education and lower subjective income, the unemployed and the low-skilled 
workers to feel more threatened by immigrants. Furthermore, older individuals are 
expected to be more negative toward immigrants (e.g., Hercowitz-Amir, Raijman & 
Davidov 2017; Meuleman, Davidov & Billiet, 2009; Semyonov, Raijman & Goro-
dzeisky, 2006).
Religious involvement is the mean of items measuring subjective religiosity 
(ESS item rlgdgr), attendance of religious services (rlgatnd) and frequency of pray-
ing (pray). Political orientation is measured by self-placement on a left (0) to right 
(10) scale. This scale was categorized into three groups, namely, left (scores 0-4), 
center (5), and right (6-10). To handle the considerable nonresponse of this item, 
we added a fourth category for the missing values. Secular persons as well as left-
leaning individuals are assumed to express lower levels of perceived ethnic threat 
(see, e.g., Hercowitz-Amir et al., 2017).
Descriptive statistics for the variables are displayed in Appendix 2.
Statistical Modeling
The random effect models are estimated by means of the MIXED procedure of 
SAS 9.3, using a restricted maximum likelihood estimation method. To obtain stan-
dard errors that are robust against deviations of the distributional assumptions of 
the random effects (such as non-normality), we furthermore used the “sandwich 
estimator” (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 2000: 87ff). All analyses are weighted to 
correct for cross-national differences in sampling design (dweight). All continuous 
individual-level predictor variables were centered around their grand mean prior to 
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the analysis. Apart from political orientation – where a separate category for the 
missing values is created – we applied listwise deletion to deal with the item non-
response. The amount of missing values in the data was quite limited and lower 
than 5% on average ranging between 4.6% for the variable economic threat and 
0.1% for gender. Therefore, we do not expect that using listwise deletion distorts our 
conclusions (see Schafer & Graham, 2002).
Results
Trends in Perceived Threat, 2002-2012
Before presenting the societal growth curves, we explore the development in threat 
perceptions over the period 2002-2012. Considerable cross-country differences 
can be observed in the level of perceived economic threat (see Figure 1), rang-
ing from as low as 3.36 (Luxemburg, 2002) to as high as 7.22 (Cyprus, 2012) (on 
a scale from 0 to 10). These differences follow regional patterns, with the lowest 
levels of economic threat in Northern Europe and the highest scores in Eastern 
and Southern Europe. Longitudinal developments within countries appear to be 
smaller than between-country differences. The most notable change is observed in 
Ireland, where economic threat shifts from 4.04 (2006) to 5.85 (2010). Progression 
of economic threat is patterned along regional lines as well. In the Nordic coun-
tries, which already displayed comparatively low threat in 2002, economic threat 
perceptions tend to stabilize or even diminish. In Southern Europe, by way of con-
trast, a clear upward trend is notable. It is revealing to observe that between 2008 
(the outbreak of the financial crisis) and 2010 (when its impact on the economy was 
becoming clear), economic threat perceptions became more prevalent in 20 coun-
tries, while they became weaker in 3 countries only (see also Kuntz et al., 2017). 
Regarding cultural threat (Figure 2), the specific position of Scandinavian 
countries becomes even more distinct. Northern Europeans perceive substantially 
less cultural threat compared to citizens in Western, Eastern, and Southern Europe. 
Importantly, longitudinal changes in cultural threat are less outspoken than in the 
case of economic threat. At least during our time window of observation, cultural 
threat perceptions seem to be a more stable phenomenon, while economic threat 
perceptions tend to fluctuate substantially. 
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Figure 1: Development of perceived economic threat in 28 countries (by region) – 2002-2012 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Development of perceived economic threat in 28 countries  
(by region) – 2002-2012Figure 2: Development of perceived cultural threat in 28 countries (by region) – 2002-2012 
  
  
 Figure 2 Development of perceived cultural threat in 28 countries  
(by region) – 2002-2012
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Societal Growth Curves: The Longitudinal Impact of 
Economic Conditions
To examine the effects of economic conditions on threat perceptions, we estimate a 
series of societal growth curve models for economic and cultural threat (see Tables 
1 and 2). An empty three-level model (not shown) indicates that economic and cul-
tural threat perceptions vary significantly across individuals, country time points 
combinations as well as countries. The lion’s share of the total variation can be 
attributed to the individual level. Variations of threat between countries (7.5% of 
the total variance for economic threat vs. 12.9% for cultural threat) are considerably 
larger than longitudinal variations of threat within countries. Notably, the longitu-
dinal variation of economic threat (2.0%) is more than double than that of cultural 
threat (0.9%).
Models 1E (Table 1) and 1C (Table 2) estimate growth curves by including 
time as a predictor. A linear time trend combined with a dummy for 2010 (picking 
up an additional change in 2010 over and above the linear process) provides the 
most appropriate description of the data. For both forms of threat, the linear time 
effect is insignificant, but does have significant random slope variation. This means 
that, on average across all countries, threat perceptions remain stable between 
2002 and 2012; the linear trend does vary cross-nationally, however, with increases 
in some countries and decreases in others. One particular ripple disturbs the linear 
development of threat perceptions. The dummy for 2010 has a significant and posi-
tive effect. In 2010 (i.e., following the outbreak of the financial crisis), economic 
and cultural threat perceptions were respectively 0.116 and 0.120 units higher than 
what is expected based on the general time trend. This pattern confirms that immi-
grant-related threat perceptions have increased across Europe after the 2008 crisis 
(supporting Hypothesis 1), although the magnitude of the increase should not be 
overrated. Furthermore, the 2010 increase in threat perceptions was instantaneous 
and had receded by 2012. 
Indicators of the economic context as well as individual characteristics are 
added in Models 2E and 2C. Economic and cultural threat perceptions are – to a 
large extent but not completely – driven by the same set of individual predictors. As 
expected by theories of ethnic competition, threat perceptions are most outspoken 
among individuals with a lower socioeconomic status. Fewer years of education 
and a lower (subjective) income seem conducive towards increased threat percep-
tions. Concerning employment status, the highest levels of threat perceptions are 
observed among blue collar workers, followed by persons who are unemployed, 
retired, disabled, or homemakers. Members of the higher service class and those in 
education feel least threatened. Furthermore, also persons living in a rural environ-
ment express higher levels of economic and cultural threat. Consistent with previ-
sous research (e.g. Semyonov, Raijman & Gorodzeisky, 2006), political orientation 
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is among the strongest predictors of perceived threat: left-leaning individuals feel 
culturally as well as economically less threatened. Apart from these similarities, 
three individual variables have a differential impact. Males feel economically less 
threatened than females, while no gender gap is present for cultural threat. Further-
more, the highest levels of cultural threat are found among respondents between the 
ages of 55 and 74 years, while this age group does not deviate from the reference 
category (aged 45-54 years) on economic threat. Finally, religiosity has a small 
tempering effect on economic threat but shows no significant relationship with cul-
tural threat. 
To find out whether changes in the economic context affect threat percep-
tions, Models 2E and 2C include the country time-invariant (cross-sectional) and 
the time-varying (longitudinal) components of two economic variables, namely, 
the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth. The longitudinal components of 
unemployment and economic growth have a significant impact on feelings of eco-
nomic threat. In times of rising unemployment rates and plummeting growth rates, 
citizens’ anxieties that immigration poses a threat to the national economy gain 
momentum (supporting Hypothesis 2). These longitudinal effects of economic con-
text are substantial. Spain, for example, experienced an increase in unemployment 
rate of 12.4 percentage points and a drop in economic growth of 3.8 percentage 
points between 2005-6 (the 3rd ESS round) and 2010-11 (the 5th ESS round). Model 
2E predicts that the combination of these economic shocks increased economic 
threat perceptions across the whole Spanish population with more than 0.6 points, 
which implies a considerable increase. It is of crucial importance to reiterate that 
these parameters refer to longitudinal effects, capturing the impact that national 
economic conditions at particular time points have on the evolution of threat per-
ceptions within countries. At the same time, no significant cross-sectional rela-
tionships between the average country levels of economic context and economic 
threat are detected. Model 2E explains 7.8% of the individual variation, 42.7% of 
the variation between country-years and 25.1% of the between-country differences 
in economic threat. The model is thus quite successful in explaining why a coun-
try’s level of economic threat is higher at particular time points than in other years. 
Note that the effect of the dummy for 2010 has become insignificant, indicating 
that the high levels of economic threat in that particular year are indeed driven by 
economic changes.
Whereas economic conditions shape the development of perceived economic 
threat, no such contextual effects are found for cultural threat. The idea that immi-
gration threatens the nation’s cultural life is not only relatively stable over time, but 
also completely detached from economic changes. Crisis-induced threat percep-
tions seem to be limited to concerns about economy, and do not generalize to the 
cultural realm. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 3. For cultural threat, Model 
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2C explains 22.7%, 37.3%, and 8.0% of the variance of the dependent variable at the 
country, country-time, and individual levels respectively.
One of the specific features of the societal growth curve approach is that con-
textual variables are decomposed into a cross-sectional and a longitudinal com-
ponent. In order to scrutinize the similarities and differences with the classical 
approach –that is, including the raw context variables, without decomposition- we 
additionally estimated models in which only the unemployment rates and GDP 
growth scores in the year of the survey are included.3 We find that the effects of 
unemployment rate (on economic threat: 0.0351; on cultural threat: 0.0043) and 
GDP growth (on economic threat: -0.0530; on cultural threat: -0.0031) are very 
similar to the longitudinal effects found in Models 2E and 2C. This similarity is 
however particular for the current analysis. It is most likely a result of the fact that 
the cross-sectional effects per se in our growth models are quite small and insignifi-
cant. This may not always be the case, however. In some cases the cross-sectional 
component of a country score may have an effect on the dependent variable that is 
stronger or even opposite compared to the effect of the longitudinally varying com-
ponent. Without decomposition, the estimated context effect is a mixture between 
the cross-sectional and the longitudinal effect. If both effects are considerable and 
different, omitting the decomposition can lead to incorrect conclusions.
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the effect of economic 
conditions on economic and cultural threat respectively, controlling for the inflow 
of foreign immigrants (per capita).4 Neither the longitudinal nor the cross-sectional 
components of foreign immigration are related to either economic or cultural threat 
perceptions. The most important conclusion from this additional model is that the 
longitudinal effects of the economic variables unemployment and economic growth 
on economic threat remain significant, and are thus not driven by a possible con-
nection between migration movements and the severity of the economic crisis.
3 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. The full results are 
not shown here, but can be obtained from the first author.
4 The full results are not shown here, but can be obtained from the first author. This 
control variable was only included in this stage of the modeling process because the 
migration flow statistics contain several missing values and lead to the exclusion of the 
following country-years: FR 2002; FR 2004; GR 2002; GR 2004; IS 2004; PT 2002; 
PT 2004; PT 2006).
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Table 1 Societal growth curve models for economic threat
Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Intercept 5.155 (0.124)*** 5.195 (0.287)*** 5.650 (0.348)***
Time -0.006 (0.025) -0.031 (0.016) -0.040 (0.025)
Dummy: time-point 2008 0.116 (0.055)* -0.122 (0.068) -0.159 (0.087)
Gender
male -0.264 (0.028)*** -0.261 (0.027)***
female (ref.cat.)
Age category
16-24 years 0.155 (0.056)** 0.141 (0.055)*
25-34 years 0.103 (0.031)*** 0.100 (0.030)***
35-44 years 0.049 (0.021)* 0.050 (0.020)*
45-54 years (ref.cat.)
55-64 years 0.023 (0.033) 0.025 (0.032)
65-74 years 0.023 (0.058) 0.029 (0.057)
75 years and over 0.047 (0.064) 0.044 (0.064)
Education -0.099 (0.006)*** -0.101 (0.006)***
Activity status
Self-employed -0.300 (0.044)*** -0.295 (0.044)***
Higher service class -0.632 (0.056)*** -0.614 (0.054)***
White collar -0.393 (0.039)*** -0.389 (0.038)***
Blue collar (ref.cat.)
Unemployed -0.102 (0.040)* -0.103 (0.040)*
Retired -0.183 (0.033)*** -0.187 (0.033)***
In education -0.764 (0.045)*** -0.758 (0.044)***
Doing housework -0.235 (0.037)*** -0.219 (0.034)***
Disabled -0.022 (0.049) -0.032 (0.050)
Other -0.405 (0.066)*** -0.391 (0.065)***
Subjective income -0.300 (0.013)*** -0.307 (0.012)***
Urbanization -0.068 (0.008)*** -0.069 (0.007)***
Religious involvement -0.030 (0.009)*** -0.028 (0.009)**
Left-right placement
Left (ref.cat.)
Centre 0.370 (0.053)*** 0.357 (0.053)***
Right 0.308 (0.082)*** 0.300 (0.082)***
Missing 0.600 (0.060)*** 0.593 (0.060)***
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Model 1E Model 2E Model 3E
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Fixed effects - context variables
Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 0.035 (0.012)** 0.033 (0.016)*
Unemp. - Cross-sectional 0.049 (0.042) 0.010 (0.051)
GDP growth - Longitudinal -0.052 (0.015)*** -0.050 (0.023)*
GDP growth -  
Cross-sectional -0.115 (0.106) -0.180 (0.134)
Education x Unemp. rate - 
Longit. -0.004 (0.001)***
Random effects
Level 3: Var. country inter-
cept 0.366 (0.114)*** 0.326 (0.102)*** 0.311 (0.155)**
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.010 (0.005)* 0.003 (0.003) 0.005 (0.004)
Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.083 (0.013)*** 0.065 (0.011)*** 0.065 (0.023)***
Level 2: Var. slope education 0.000 (0.000)***
Level 1: Residual variance 5.224 (0.016)*** 4.817 (0.015)*** 4.787 (0.015)***
Deviance 941487.7 924925.3 924479.9
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals=205,759, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28
Table 2  Societal growth curve models for cultural threat
Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Intercept 4.488 (0.160)*** 4.173 (0.336)*** 5.087 (0.388)***
Time 0.006 (0.021) 0.014 (0.020) 0.002 (0.028)
Dummy: time-point 2008 0.120 (0.035)** 0.085 (0.065) 0.050 (0.098)
Gender
male 0.057 (0.036) 0.062 (0.036)
female (ref.cat.)
Age category
16-24 years 0.133 (0.061)* 0.113 (0.061)
25-34 years 0.002 (0.035) -0.002 (0.033)
35-44 years -0.026 (0.016) -0.025 (0.015)
45-54 years (ref.cat.)
55-64 years 0.066 (0.028)* 0.069 (0.028)*
65-74 years 0.146 (0.054)** 0.159 (0.052)**
75 years and over 0.234 (0.059)*** 0.238 (0.058)***
Table 1 continued
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Model 1C Model 2C Model 3C
Fixed effects - indiv. level Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE Par. Est. SE
Education -0.103 (0.008)*** -0.105 (0.008)***
Activity status
Self-employed -0.228 (0.042)*** -0.219 (0.043)***
Higher service class -0.505 (0.060)*** -0.473 (0.056)***
White collar -0.407 (0.041)*** -0.400 (0.040)***
Blue collar (ref.cat.)
Unemployed -0.144 (0.051)** -0.146 (0.050)**
Retired -0.099 (0.036)** -0.103 (0.036)**
In education -0.722 (0.052)*** -0.712 (0.051)***
Doing housework -0.199 (0.039)*** -0.176 (0.038)***
Disabled 0.000 (0.055) -0.018 (0.053)
Other -0.377 (0.077)*** -0.363 (0.076)***
Subjective income -0.230 (0.015)*** -0.243 (0.015)***
Urbanization -0.059 (0.013)*** -0.064 (0.012)***
Religious involvement -0.014 (0.009) -0.011 (0.009)
Left-right placement
Left (ref.cat.)
Centre 0.492 (0.064)*** 0.468 (0.063)***
Right 0.564 (0.105)*** 0.548 (0.105)***
Missing 0.682 (0.079)*** 0.669 (0.078)***
Fixed effects - context variables
Unemp. rate - Longitudinal 0.004 (0.012) -0.012 (0.021)
Unemp. - Cross-sectional 0.033 (0.049) -0.051 (0.052)
GDP growth - Longitudinal -0.003 (0.012) -0.011 (0.026)
GDP growth -  
Cross-sectional -0.084 (0.138) -0.198 (0.138)
Education x Unemp. rate - 
Longit. -0.003 (0.002)
Random effects
Level 3:  
Var. country intercept 0.713 (0.202)** 0.619 (0.184)** 0.673 (0.210)**
Level 3: Var. slope time 0.008 (0.004)* 0.008 (0.004)* 0.009 (0.006)
Level 2: Var. country-year 
intercept 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.034 (0.006)*** 0.083 (0.019)***
Level 2: Var. slope education 0.002 (0.000)***
Level 1: Residual variance 5.344 (0.017)*** 4.917 (0.015)*** 4.885 (0.015)***
Deviance 946739.0 929758.3 928820.8
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; Nindividuals= 205,905, Ncountry-years=137, Ncountries=28
Table 2 continued
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The fourth hypothesis – namely, that the longitudinal effects of the eco-
nomic context are stronger among low-educated individuals – is tested in Models 
3E and 3C. These models now contain a random slope for education (implying 
that the educational gradient of threat perceptions can vary across countries and 
time points) as well as a cross-level interaction effects between education and the 
time-varying component of the unemployment rate (testing whether the longitudi-
nal effect of unemployment rates differs across educational groups).5 In the case of 
economic threat, the longitudinal effects of unemployment are indeed different for 
various educational groups (see Figure 3). For an individual with an average level 
of education (12.5 years), represented by the middle line in Figure 3, economic 
threat perceptions increase by 0.033 point for every percentage point increase in 
unemployment rate. The negative cross-level interaction parameter (-0.004) indi-
cates that this effect of unemployment becomes weaker as education increases. For 
individuals who have had 19 years of education (i.e., 6.85 years more than the aver-
age, corresponding to the 90th percentile in the dataset), the longitudinal effect of 
unemployment approaches zero, meaning that unemployment rates are no longer 
related to threat levels. For respondents with only 7 years of formal education (i.e., 
5.85 years less than the average, corresponding to the 10th percentile), the impact 
of unemployment context is twice as strong as for the average person. This signifi-
cant cross-level interaction effect shows that contextual labor market processes do 
not instigate economic threat perceptions uniformly across the whole population. 
Instead, this sociotropic source of threat seems to affect, in the first place, persons 
with lower education (i.e., those with a more vulnerable position in the society and 
the labor market), while the threat perceptions of the highly educated are more 
immune to the impact of labor market changes.
A similar test (not shown here) revealed that the cross-level interaction between 
real GDP growth rate and education is insignificant. Hereby, Hypothesis 4 is only 
partially supported by the data. In the case of cultural threat, none of the cross-level 
interactions was significant (which is not surprising given that the main effect of the 
economic context was insignificant for cultural threat). 
In sum, this analysis reveals that economic threat perceptions have increased 
after the 2008 crisis (supporting Hypothesis 1), although the increase was only tem-
porary. Furthermore, the changes in threat perceptions are driven by changes in 
the economic context (supporting Hypothesis 2) and are only observed for the eco-
nomic component of threat (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the effects of economic condi-
tions are more outspoken of the lower-educated individuals (Hypothesis 4).
5 We test the cross-level interaction for education rather than for employment status, 
because the latter variable is categorical which makes the estimation and interpreta-
tion of the interaction more difficult and less insightful. A similar hypothesis could in 
principle be tested for subjective income. However, including multiple interactions of 
connected variables at the same time makes the results less insightful.
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Conclusions and Discussion
The first purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the practical implementation of 
a statistical model to analyze multi-country repeated cross-sectional datasets. 
While such datasets are increasingly available, few cross-national studies opti-
mally exploit the richness of datasets containing information on citizens surveyed 
in various countries and at different time points. The second purpose of this paper 
is to utilize the model to analyze the effect of the economic crisis on threat due 
to immigration among Europeans. We do this by providing a novel application of 
the societal growth curve model introduced by Fairbrother (2014) testing whether 
the 2008 economic crisis has affected perceptions of ethnic threat among Euro-
pean citizens. More concretely, drawing on the dynamic version of group conflict 
theory, the current study addressed the following three research questions: (1) In 
 
This figure represents predicted levels of economic threat for various values of education 
(10th percentile in the highest curve, 50th percentile in the middle curve, 90th percentile in 
the lowest curve) and the time-varying component of the unemployment rate (full range), 
as well as 95% confidence bands for these predictions (the grey zone around the curves). 
Figure 3 The interaction effect between education and the time-varying com-
ponent of national unemployment rates
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what way has the prevalence of perceived immigrant threat in European societies 
evolved in the period before and after the peak of the economic crisis in 2008? (2) 
Are the observed developments in perceived economic and cultural threat driven 
by crisis-related changes in economic conditions? (3) Does the crisis affect threat 
perceptions across the whole population, or are crisis effects instead contingent on 
socioeconomic status? We answered these questions by analyzing ESS data from 
28 different European countries spanning the years 2002 to 2012. 
Societal growth curve analysis substantiates in various ways that economic 
contexts shape the majority group perceptions that immigration poses a threat to 
the national economy. Between 2008 (just before or during the outbreak of the 
financial crisis) and 2010 (i.e., when the impact of the crisis on the “real economy” 
was becoming clear), we detected an increase – albeit short-lived – in economic 
threat perceptions in 20 European countries. Even more conclusive is the finding 
that rates of unemployment and economic growth have a longitudinal effect on eco-
nomic threat perceptions: In times when unemployment rates increase and growth 
rates plummet, citizens’ perceptions that immigrants threaten the economy become 
more widespread. These effects are purely longitudinal in the sense that they refer 
to the dynamics within countries (instead of cross-sectional differences between 
countries), and therefore lend strong support to the dynamic version of group threat 
theory. The deterioration of economic conditions in Europe indeed instigated fears 
that immigrants threaten economic prerogatives of the majority group, which might 
in turn open the door to exclusionary attitudes and discriminatory behavior. The 
difficult economic situation that Europe has been facing over the past years offers a 
breeding ground in which economic threat perceptions can easily take root. Finally, 
the model demonstrated that the effect of the economic crisis (i.e., increasing unem-
ployment rates) is stronger among individuals with lower educational credentials.
The impact of economic conditions on threat perceptions is substantial, but 
should not be overstated and qualified in several respects. First of all, despite the 
fact that our analysis covered a period of unprecedented economic instability, 
changes in threat perceptions remain relatively limited. Differences between coun-
tries or citizens are markedly more outspoken than longitudinal variation. A severe 
economic shock (comparable to what a country like Spain experienced) produces 
an effect similar in size to the effect of social class (blue-collar workers vs. higher 
service class) or political orientation (left vs. right), but does not exceed the joint 
impact of individual-level predictors. Second, our results suggest that the economic 
crisis had an instantaneous effect rather than a long-lasting one. Threat percep-
tions did increase in the aftermath of the 2008 outbreak of the crisis, but had fallen 
back to pre-crisis levels by 2012. As soon as the labor market recovers and eco-
nomic production takes off again, economic threat perceptions dissipate. Third, the 
impact of the economic crisis appears to be restricted to economic threat. Feelings 
of cultural threat are found to be relatively stable over time and to be completely 
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detached from economic dynamics. At least within our window of observation, 
crisis-induced threat perceptions do not generalize to the idea that immigrants pose 
a threat to cultural life. 
In sum, societal growth curve models offer promising opportunities to inves-
tigate the drivers and timing of attitude change. Further research could take this 
argument and method even further, for example by investigating shorter time spans, 
and linking public opinion to monthly instead of yearly context data. Our study 
shows that the societal growth curve models offer opportunities to analyze cross-
national repeated cross-sections. Most importantly, by distinguishing between 
cross-sectional and longitudinal context effects, this approach successfully avoids 
the problem of weak internal validity that one faces when analyzing single-shot 
cross-sectional data. 
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Appendices
Appendix 1  Sample sizes per country and year
Round 1  
2002
Round 2  
2004
Round 3  
2006
Round 4  
2008
Round 5  
2010
Round 6  
2012 Total
Austria (AT) 1,973 2,023 2,198 - - - - - - 6,194
Belgium (BE) 1,700 1,574 1,611 1,535 1,473 1,565 9,458
Bulgaria (BG) - - - - 1,179 1,816 1,978 1,844 6,817
Switzerland (CH) 1,610 1,671 1,402 1,338 1,094 1,079 8,194
Cyprus (CY) - - - - 932 1,105 1,000 985 4,022
Czech Republic (CZ) 1,278 2,851 - - 1,937 2,281 1,929 10,276
Germany (DE) 2,648 2,575 2,619 2,459 2,686 2,597 15,584
Denmark (DK) 1,417 1,404 1,404 1,491 1,453 1,518 8,687
Estonia (EE) - - 1,395 958 1,147 1,383 1,714 6,597
Spain (ES) 1,616 1,489 1,682 2,305 1,660 1,633 10,385
Finland (FI) 1,924 1,977 1,824 2,118 1,797 2,079 11,719
France (FR) 1,314 1,621 1,762 1,861 1,532 1,715 9,805
Great Britain (GB) 1,796 1,662 2,086 2,037 2,070 1,946 11,597
Greece (GR) 2,279 2,135 - - 1,886 2,370 - - 8,670
Croatia (HR) - - - - - - 1,272 1,407 - - 2,679
Hungary (HU) 1,562 1,414 1,406 1,433 1,447 1,874 9,136
Ireland (IE) 1,866 2,111 1,538 1,462 2,146 2,218 11,341
Iceland (IS) - - 553 - - - - - - 691 1,244
Italy (IT) 1,171 1,487 - - - - - - 883 3,541
Lithuania (LT) - - - - - - - - 1,519 1,938 3,457
Luxembourg (LU) 951 1,043 - - - - - - - - 1,994
Netherlands (NL) 2,167 1,690 1,688 1,572 1,657 1,639 10,413
Norway (NO) 1,881 1,607 1,596 1,394 1,351 1,384 9,213
Poland (PL) 2,027 1,672 1,682 1,576 1,707 1,843 10,507
Portugal (PT) 1,412 1,922 1,995 2,199 1,990 2,002 11,520
Sweden (SE) 1,766 1,745 1,690 1,591 1,300 1,585 9,677
Slovenia (SI) 1,349 1,316 1,338 1,161 1,255 1,127 7,546
Slovakia (SK) - - 1,388 1,558 1,666 1,727 1,719 8,058
Total 35,707 40,325 34,148 38,361 40,283 39,507 228,331
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Appendix 2  Descriptive statistics
Percent N
Gender
female 53.5 122,057
male 46.5 106,018
Total 100.0 228,075
Age category
16-24 14.0 31,738
25-34 14.8 33,624
35-44 17.2 38,979
45-54 17.1 38,847
55-64 16.4 37,206
65-74 12.6 28,714
75+ 8.0 18,141
Total 100.0 227,249
Employment status
self-employed 6.5 14,626
higher service class 6.3 14,185
white-collar workers 20.9 47,052
blue-collar workers 14.9 33,576
unemployed 5.2 11,835
retired 24.5 55,458
in education 8.6 19,496
homemakers 9.1 20,596
disabled 2.3 5,282
other 1.3 2,922
Total 99.6 225,028
Left-right placement
Left 27.7 63,239
Center 28.82 65,804
Right 30.92 70,598
Missing 12.57 28,690
Mean SD Min Max N
Economic threat perceptions 5.21 2.39 0 10 217917
Cultural threat perceptions 4.50 2.49 0 10 218073
Education (in years) 12.10 4.03 0 30 225821
Subjective income 2.98 0.86 1 4 222897
Urbanization 3.04 1.21 1 5 227676
Religious involvement 4.40 2.55 0.71 10 227353
